
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1.9422 Pa2W35 Feb.3,1943 cop.1

# UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE Food Distribution Administration Washington, D. C.



1.9422 722W35 Feb.3,1943 Cop.1

Why the 3 Percent Increase in Agricultural Freight Rates Should be Removed

Summary of Statement by Frederick V. Waugh, Chief, Program Analysis and Appraisal Branch, at the hearing of the Interstate Commerce Commission, on Ex Parte 148, Washington, D. C., February 3, 1943

The Secretary of Agriculture, through counsel and witness, appears at this hearing in a dual role. First, as Secretary of Agriculture, and secondly under his war powers as the Government officer charged with full responsibility for and control over the Nation's food program under Executive Order 9280. Incident to this latter capacity the Secretary has established in the Department a Food Production Administration and a Food Distribution Administration. The great power and authority of these Administrations will be brought to bear on the agricultural program of the Nation. I point this out to give added weight to the testimony I expect to give with reference to increased agricultural production and distribution for the duration of the war and for an indefinite period thereafter.

On March 18, 1942 railroad freight rates on most commodities were increased. Rates on most agricultural products were increased by 3 percent. The railroads had requested increases of 10 percent on the ground that such an increase was necessary to cover higher wage rates and other operating costs. In the hearings on this matter the Department of Agriculture took the position that no general increase in rates was necessary for agricultural products because it seemed apparent to the Department that there would be in 1942 a greatly expanded output not only of agricultural products but of war materials and other commodities. The Department argued further that the revenue from this increased volume of traffic would be ample to cover the increased expenses of the railroads. Reviewing what happened during the past year, we believe this position was fully justified. Mailroad revenues have increased much more than enough to take care of added operating costs. As a result, the net revenues of the railroads are the highest in a number of years.

This point has been covered in some detail by the testimony presented by the Office of Price Administration. Furthermore, the records of railroad revenues and expenses are available to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Under these circumstances it is not necessary for the Depart-

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ment of Agriculture to take the time of this Commission to discuss the railroad revenue situation in any detail. We simply wish to repeat our statement of last year, and as reiterated in our petition, that the increase which was granted in 1942 was not necessary to cover the increased costs of the railroads; to note that this has been amply verified by developments of the past year; and to state that in our best judgment it would be both possible and desirable now to rescind the action taken last year and to reduce the rates on agricultural products to the levels prevailing before March 18, 1942.

#### Record Agricultural Production in 1942

At the hearing last year the Department stated its belief that the production of a ricultural products would be substantially increased.

This was not an idle statement, although some participants in the hearing appeared to be skeptical of the ability of anyone to forecast agricultural output. The Department conducted a vigorous "agricultural soals program" to increase the acreage of the most essential crops and to provide farmors the assistance they most needed in order to get a maximum output of crops and livestock products. It is not to be overlooked; of course, that good weather prevailed during the growing season of 1942, but the efforts of the Department and the whole-hearted cooperation of farmors were very substantial factors in assuring the food supplies we needed. The result of this combination of a strong Department of Agriculture program, excellent cooperation of farmors, and fine weather was the greatest output of agricultural products which ever occurred in this country.

The details of crop production in recent years are shown in Exhibit A. We should like to call your attention to the following figures which illustrate some of the increases that took place:

Corn: 1942 production 19 percent greater than 1941. (The increase for all grains was 11 percent).

Cotton: 1942 production 21 percent greater than 1941.

Soybeans (a crop of rapidly gowing importance): 1942 production almost double that in 1941. (Peanut production also increased 70 percent).

Sugarcano and sugar beets: 1942 production 19 and 16 percent, respectively, greater than 1941.

It is, of course, difficult to get from such a detailed exhibit a clear, simple picture of the increase which occurred. Perhaps the simplest statement we can make is that the total estimated tennage of crops



reported increased from some 353 million tons in 1941 to nearly 388 million tons in 1942 -- a 10 percent increase.

There can be no doubt that the railroads benefited very substantially from this increased output of agricultural products. The quarterly statistical report of the Interstate Commerce Commission's Pureau of Statistics shows that for the first 9 months of 1942, Class 1 reilroads originated 77,076,852 tons of commodities included in the classification "products of agriculture." This was an increase over the same period in 1941 of nearly 12 percent.

Figures given in Exhibit A refer only to crops and do not include livestock and livestock products. However, it is quite evident that the output of livestock and livestock products increased even more than the output of crops. The Commission reports that the tennage of animals and products originated during the first 9 months of 1942 increased more than 24 percent over the volume hauled during the corresponding period of 1941. Livestock receipts by rail at 68 markets, as shown in Exhibit 3, likewise bear testimenty to the increased volume of this type of business which the railroads have obtained. Increases for the year as a whole averaged 25.0 percent over 1941. Considering the fact that the heaviest movement of farm products occurs during the late fall months, it is expected that complete reports on rail movement of farm products for 1942 will show even greater increases than were shown during the first 9 months of the year.

# Continued Heavy Rail Towement of Farm Products Expected in 1943

No one yet has been able to forecast the weather accurately over long periods. We all will admit that the weather in 1943 will affect agricultural production. But we should remember that agricultural production depends only in part upon the weather. It depends also upon the acreage planted; the number of animals raised; the amount of feed available; the farm labor situation; and similar factors -- many of which we can already forecast with a reasonable degree of accuracy. The considered judgment of the Department of Agriculture is that production in 1943 will continue at high levels.

The Department of Agriculture and the Sperptary of Adriculture under his war powers have thrown all their resources into the production goals campaign this year. The goals which have been established are shown in Exhibit C. The goals themselves are usually stated in terms of

acreage and numbers of livestock. In addition to this information, Exhibit C shows the volume of agricultural production which would occur with normal growing conditions.

It will not be easy for the farmers of the United States to reach these high goals. They are confronted with extremely serious problems, including the shortage of farm labor, inadequate equipment and supplies, the disruption of marketing arrangements in some areas, and higher costs of production generally. Still, the important fact for us to note here is that the goals as shown in Exhibit C call for a continued high output from American farms and that all agricultural resources of the Government and, we believe, of American farmers generally will be devoted to that end. We need the large output very badly and are doing everything we can possibly do to help the farmer reach it. We are confident that we can find ways of evercoming the worst difficulties and of making it ressible for agriculture to continue to produce the amounts of food needed by our domestic consumers, by our military forces, by our Allies, and by civilians in reoccupied countries.

Moreover, we should note that the increased food supplies which are badly needed must move in large part by rail. We do not have to submit any elaborate factual material here to prove that there is a shortage of gasoline and rubber, as well as trucking equipment. Judicial notice could well be taken of this fact. This is being felt more and more in farming communities. Many farm products which formerly would have moved by truck now must move by rail. The importance of the previous truck movement of farm products is well brought out by the fact that with some commodity groups, such as fresh fruits and vospitables, nearly half of the total movement has hitherto been by truck. Some of this truck movement has been over fairly long distances of several hundred miles. Trucks for moving agricultural products will become increasingly scarce for a long time to come. Farmors, food processors, and dealers in farm products will have to rely more and more on the railroads for moving their products.

#### Long-Time Outlook for Agricultural Production

It is not only possible to forecast, in a general way at least, the probable output of agricultural products in 1943 but to visualize general outlines for the long-time picture some of which are already clearly apparent. The war, of course, has made it absolutely essential that the American farmer continue to produce large quantities of food.

These increased food supplies must be maintained if we are going to win the war and if we are going to prevent wholesale starvation and political upheavals throughout the world after the war.

We are confident that agricultural production will be maintained at high levels for many years and that the railroads will continue to enjoy a large volume of agricultural traffic. Moreover, huge stocks of some commodities already exist, and will be moved into consumption. As shown in Exhibit D, huge stocks of wheat are available for shipment. This wheat, which has already been produced, is vet to be moved and will add to the rail traffic in the coming years. A substantial part of these stocks, as well as a large part of the increases in current production of agricultural commodities and foods, will be shipped abroad and will move almost entirely by rail to the ports where it is loaded into ships. Reasons of military secrecy prevent giving details of such shipments. The Secretary of Agriculture 1/ has stated, however, that "military and lend-lease needs together took between 12 and 13 percent of last year's food production", and that "our armed forces and allies will need almost a quarter of all we produce in 1943." All Lend-Lease foods are moved under the regular commercial rates -- not land grant rates.

We have shown that agricultural traffic on the railroads was increased very substantially in 1942; that it will remain high throughout 1943; and that we have every reason to believe that rail shipments of agricultural products will be maintained at high levels for a number of years. We contend that this is an important fact which should be taken into consideration in determining freight rates. In the long run the railroads, as well as the farmer and the consumer, will be benefited more by handling a large volume at moderate rates, than by handling a small volume at high rates.

### Heavier Loadings of Agricultural Products in 1942

The railroads not only movedmore agricultural traffic in 1942, but they did it without a corresponding increase in locomotives and freight cars. This was accomplished by heavier loading of railroad equipment, the combining of shipments, and quicker release of cars. The Department of Agriculture did everything it could, in cooperation with the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Office of Defense Transportation, to encourage these heavier loadings and other economics. The county agents and the Agricultural War Board members throughout the country have been kept in-

<sup>1/</sup> Address before the Pational Association of Wholesale Grocers, Chicago, January 27, 1943

formed of the conservation program and orders of the Office of Defense
Transportation, and they took a very active part in encouraging shippers
to adjust their methods to new requirements and conditions in order that
existing equipment could be used as fully and as effectively as possible.
The Department of Agriculture supports strongly any practicable measures
to make efficient use of our transportation facilities. The Department
believes, however, that it is only fair to point out that the monetary
advantage of such changes moes, mainly at least, to the railroads which
are given greater revenue without corresponding increases in cost. Thus,
revenue advantages from these economies made largely by the shipper, have
gone mainly to the railroads;

#### Agriculture Paying Fore for Less Service

In many cases, at least, farmers and shippers of agricultural products are receiving less service from the railroads than they received before the rates were increased. The number of days in transit have increased and schedules are uncertain. This means that the shipper has greater difficulty in planning his movements to market in order to take advantage of supply and demand situations in particular areas. He must run the risk of having perishables reach the market in periods of glut. Heavier loadings per car are also costly to the shipper and they interfere with some of his market outlets. Moreover, he must bear many extra costs, due to delays, shrinkage, deterioration, extra icing, heating, feeding of animals, etc.

During the past 10 months the farmers have been paying a 3 percent higher freight rate for less service than they had before, with the monetary benefits going to the railroads. For all practical purposes the cost of shipping agricultural products and food by rail have increased by more than 3 percent in the past year. To keep the cost of food transportation down to pre-war levels it would be necessary not only to remove the 3 percent increase, but to reduce the netual rates on these products to a point below that which existed before the war.

#### Economic Situation Confronting Agriculture

The Department of Agriculture is in close touch with farmers throughout the country. It knows that they are faced with very serious difficulties. The Department believes firmly and sincerely that it will be necessary to assure the farmer of a larger return for many farm products in order to get the supplies which are needed as an essential part

of the war program. We realize that these supplies cannot be obtained by prices alone. Farmers must also be assured of necessary labor, supplies, equipment, etc. But one of the most effective ways of helping the farmer to get these things is through insuring him adequate prices for the things he produces. For this reason the Department of Agriculture has found it necessary to announce in advance a number of specific price-support programs. Prices of agricultural commodities and foods have risen in the past year, but some must rise more if the farmer is to keep his labor on the farm.

On the other hand, it is a sttled policy of the Government not to raise the cost of living any more than is absolutely necessary. The Department of Agriculture is in accord with this policy and accordingly keeps the consumer, as well as the farmer, constantly in mind. A rise in food prices would be particularly unfortunate. Foods represent the most basic items in the cost of living. They are bought by all people -- from the richest to the poorest. The lowest-income families spend a large part of their total income for food. A rise in food prices would almost certainly result in at least a corresponding rise in wages and this would tend to set in motion an inflationary spiral which would be very difficult to control and which, if uncontrolled, would spell disaster to the farmers, to businessmen, and to all other segments of the public, including the railroads.

Thus, we are confronted with a real need for raising the returns to the producers of many foods and yet we must do this without raising the cost of living. There are only two possible solutions to this problem. The first solution is subsidy; the second is a reduction in costs of marketing. It might be possible to raise returns to farmers without increasing living costs if the Government paid substantial subsidies to the farmer, to the railroads, to the processors, to food dealers, or to consumers. Yet such a program involves many difficulties and dangers, and the policy of the Government has been to subsidize as little as possible, but to take what steps are needed to insure the farmer adequate prices in the market and at the same time to prevent unnecessary increases in retail prices.

The arithmetic of this problem is fairly simple. Unless the Government does provide substantial subsidies, the only way of giving the farmer adequate returns and at the same time preventing a rise in living costs is by reducing as far as we possibly can all the costs between the farmer and the consumer; including, for example, all charges of processing,


manufacturing, packaging, and distributing foods. This is no time to be raising charges for transportation, marketing, and distribution. We should keep those charges at an absolute minimum. The Department is working with many groups in the food industries to reduce the costs and charges for handling foods. It believes that the 3 percent increase in agricultural freight rates which was made last year was unnecessary and that it is one of many factors which is hindering our Food for Freedom Program. While freight rates may represent a small part of the retail dollar for some food items, they are much more important in the case of others. In any case, the marketing bill is made up of hundreds, and even thousands, of small charges, each of which represents a small fraction of the consumer's food dollar. One of the most important jobs on the food front is to keep all of these hundreds and thousands of charges and rates as low as we possibly can.

#### Conclusion

In view of the facts and analysis just presented the Department of Agriculture urges that freight rates on all agricultural products and foods, including livestock and livestock products, and including processed foods as well as unprocessed farm products, be so adjusted that they are no higher than the rates which existed at the beginning of 1942. It repeats that it believes this will provide the railroads with more than sufficient income to cover costs and will provide not revenues which compare very favorably with those of recent years. It will help very substantially the efforts of we need the farmer and the Government to produce the foods/to win the war and vill help materially to protect consumers against rising costs of living.

Froduction of Principal Crops in 1942 Compared With 1941 and the Average for 1930-1939, Inclusive

																	-	9																
Sweet potatoes	Potatoes	Velvet beans 6/	Peanuts picked and threshed	Ccwpeas for peas	Seyabears for beans	Peas, dry field	Reans, dry edible	Timothy seed	Lespedeza seed	Sweet claver seed	Alsike clover seed	Red clover seed .	Alfalfa seed	Hay, all	Ccttonseed	Cctton, lint	ror	for	All sorghums for grain	Popcom	Rice	Flaxseed	Buckwheat	Ryc	Barley	Oats	Wheat, all	Corn, all			Crop	1		
Bushels	Bushels	Tons	Pounds	Bushels	Bushels	Bags	Bags 5/	Bushels	Pounds	Bushels	Bushels	Bushels	Bushels	Tons	Tons	Bales	Tons 4/	Tons 3/	Bushels	Pounds	Bushels	Bushels	Eushals	Bushels	Bushels	Bushels	Bushels	Bushels		•••	. Unit :		••	
65,380	371.150	750	2,504,440	7,067	209,559	7,160	19,608	1,624	179,700	725	256	1,082	974	105,328	5 <b>,</b> 790	12,982	6,881	13,603	107,245	153,275	66,363	40,660	6,687	57,341	426,150	1,358,730	981,327	3,175,154		••	1942	(In Thousands	Production	
5	355.602	929	1,476,845	8,063	105,587	3,700	18,503	1,274	178,700	787	. 313	1,469	1,049	94,328	4,788	10,744	8,774	16,572	111,784	121,823	51,323		6,038			1,180,663	943,127	2,677,517			1941	sands)	tion	
, 20		771	1,067,138	6,411	36,385	2,471	13,510	1,755	65,786	887	314	1,057	1,101	78,733	5,890	13,246	2,459	8,803	22	2/ 86,853	CΠ	1	7,365	37 <b>,</b> 870	226,460	1,016,061	745,575	2,307,452		. Average	: 7 6961-0987 :	10801080		
105	104	81	170	88	198	194	106	127	101	92	82	74.	93	112	121	121	78	82	96	126	129	126	. 111	126	118	115	104 .	119		••	1941 :	1942 as Percentage	Production	
89	100	97	235	110	576	290	145	93	273	82	82	102	88	134	98	98	083	155	203	176	145	361	16	151	188	134	132	138	AND THE RESERVE THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O	Average	T890-T888	ntage of -	ON	





The 10-year averages are revised on the basis of the 1940 census of Agriculture, except for corn, hay, potatoes and sweet potatoes. Short-time average.

Green weight. Dry weight.

Eags of 100 pounds (uncleaned).

Production figures include same quantities not harvested. Production in commercial areas, including fruit produced for processing as well as for sale for fresh consumption. Includes all grapes for fresh fruit, juice, wine, and raisins. Equivalent tons.

Source: U. S. Department of Agriculture, Summary of Grop Reporting Board

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Cattle (excluding calves) Calves Hogs Sheep and Lambs	12-	Total	Cattle (excluding calves) Calves Hogs Sheep and Lambs	
7,978,736 2,810,318 8,668,098 13,763,208 33,220,360		87,285,789	17,979,227 6,680,515 34,415,107 28,210,940	1942
6,240,840 2,117,238 7,976,887 11,235,877 27,900,840		74,832,134	15,228,056 6,127,790 30,659,197 22,817,091	Total Receipts 1941
6,181,620 2,578,406 7,600,033 11,912,709 28,272,768		73,170,596	14,482,455 6,563,849 28,131,199 23,993,093	1937-1941
Not	SHIPM	48,734,505	11,480,460 4,276,731 23,876,963 9,100,351	RECEIPT Drive-ins 1942
Not reported	PMENTS	43,982,974	10,490,754 4,131,625 21,606,641 7,753,954	IPTS ve-ins 1941
Not		38,551,284	6,498,767 2,403,784 10,538,144 19,110,589	Rail
Not reported		30,849,160	4,737,302 1,996,165 9,052,556 15,063,137	1941
27.8 14.8 8.7 22.5		16.8	18.1% 9.0 12.3 23.6	Percer 1942 Total I
1 1 1 1		10.8	9.4% 3.5 10.5	Percent of increase, 1942 over: 1941 Total Drive-ins Rail
t t 1 t		25.0	37. 2% 20. 4 16. 4 26. 9	orease,
29.1 9.0 14.1 15.5 17.5		19.3	24.1% 1.8 22.3 17.6	1937- 1941 1/ Total

-12-

1/ Five-Year Average.

Source: Food Distribution Administration, U. S. Department of Agriculture

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Agricultural Production Goals for 1943, With Estimated Production Assuming Normal Crop Yields (Revised to January 27, 1943)

	and the contract of property of the same management of the contract of the con	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			The second secon	With the last of the case of t
	(In Thousands)			Produ (In Tho	ction usands)	
1943	1942	1943 as		1943	1942	1943 as
Goal or	Reported:	Percentage	:: Unit	••	: Reported	: Percentage
Expected	: or Expected :	of 1942		Computed	or Expected	: of 1942
52,500	52,533	100	Bushels	651,000	981,327	<b>6</b> 6
3,600	3,837	94	Bushels	40,000	57,341	70
1,380	1,505	93	Bushels	66,800	66,36 <b>3</b>	101
~	91,011	104	Bushels	2,834,000	3,175,154	89
	42,656	87	Dushels	1,137,650	1,358,730	84
18,000	19,433	93	Sushels	392,000	426,150	92
12,000	9,755	123	Bushels 3/	152,400		102
71,100	72,744	98	Tons	94,500		90
5 <b>,</b> 500	4,691	117	Bushels	39,875	40,660	86
12,000	10,762	112	Bushels	216,000	209,559	1,03
5,500	. 3 <b>,</b> 690	149	Pounds,	3,712,500	2,504,440	148
3,300	2,135	155	Bags 5/	25,542	19,608	130
725	501	145	Bags 5/	6,627	7,160	93
22,500	23,310	97	Bales 6/	11,300	12,982	87
,		`			)	
. `	792	7/ 106	Pounds	750,000	824,115	16
	351	. `	Pounds	385,000	331,005	116
	237		Pounds	286,000	262,068	109
	329		Tons 9/	525	537	86
	1,049	100	Tons 9/	1,900	1,664	114
3,260	2,793	117	Bushels	407,700	371,150	110
1,000	, 707	141	Bushels	82,000	65,380	126
1,676	1,	99	i	ı	ı	ı
4,709	S	139	•	ı		ı
300	•	1	i	ı		1
1	1	1 -	Tons	14,610	14,718	. 99
ı	1	i	Pounds	3,400,000	2,500,000	136
i	ŧ	i	Pounds	122,000,000	119,412,000	102
	i	i	Dozens	4,780,000	4,396,240	109
	1943 Goal or Expected  52,500 3,600 1,380 2/ 95,000 12,000 71,100 5,500 12,000 5,500 3,300 725 22,500 725 22,500 1,050 3,260 1,050 3,260 1,070 4,709 300	Crop Ac (In Thou 1943 : 19 Goal or : Repo Expected : or Exp 52,500 5 3,600 1 1,330 9 2/ 95,000 1 18,000 1 18,000 1 18,000 1 18,000 1 18,000 1 2,000 1 5,500 1 5,500 1 2,000 1 3,300 1 3,260 1 3,260 1 1,050 3,260 1 1,050 3,260 1 1,070 1 3,000 1 1,07	Crop Acreage (In Thousands)  1943  1943  Goal or  Reported  Expected: or Expected: of  1,380  1,380  1,380  1,505  1,380  1,505  1,100  4,656  1,100  1,100  1,72,744  5,500  3,300  4,691  1,2,000  1,72,744  5,500  3,300  2,135  725  5,500  3,300  2,135  725  841  727  841  792  340  3,260  1,049  1,050  1,676  1,070  1,692  4,709  3,392	Crop Acreage         1943       (In Thousands)       :::         Goal or       : Reported       : Fercentage       :::         Expected       : of 1942       ::       Unit         52,500       52,533       100       Bushels         3,600       3,837       94       Bushels         1,300       1,505       93       Bushels         12,000       19,433       93       Sushels         12,000       19,433       93       Sushels         12,000       19,762       123       Bushels         12,000       10,762       117       Bushels         12,000       10,762       112       Bushels         5,500       4,691       117       Bushels         5,500       10,762       112       Bushels         5,500       2,135       155       Bags 5         72,500       23,310       97       Bales 6         22,500       23,310       97       Bales 5         841       792       7/106       Pounds         85       120       Pounds         9,793       117       Bushels         1,676       1,692	Crop Acreage       :: 1943         1945       (In Thousands)       :: 1942       :: 1943         Coal or       :: 1942       :: 1943       :: 1943         Goal or       :: Reported       :: Percentage       :: Unit       : 1943         52,500       52,533       100       Bushels       40         1,380       1,505       93       Bushels       40         1,380       1,505       93       Bushels       651         37,300       42,656       87       Bushels       2,834         12,000       19,433       93       Bushels       392         71,100       72,744       98       Tons       392         12,000       19,762       117       Bushels       392         1,500       3,690       149       Pounds       391         1,500       3,690       149       Pounds       391         22,550       2,135       155       Bags 5       25         22,500       23,310       97       Bales 6       11         22,500       23,31       97       106       Pounds       385         25,793       11       10       Tons 9	Crop Morage

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Chickens, total slaughtered 14/ Turkey, slaughter	Hogs, slaughtered	Cattle and calves, slaughter Sheop and lambs slaughtered	
	100,000 25,720	30,400 24,100	
i i	80,000 25,200	27,900 26,000	Animal Tumbers (In Thousands)
1 1	125 102	109	
Pounds 12/	Pounds 12/	Pounds 12/ Pounds 12/	
4,000,000 560,000	13,800,000	000,066 000,016,01	Production (In Thousands
3,118,000 485,000	10,900,000	000,080,000 1,060,000	Production (In Thousands)
128 115	126	109 93	

Acreage shown is larvosted acres.

No limit imposed or corn acreage.

Equivalent production on acreage of grain sorghums for all purposes.

Estimated November 1, 1942.

500-pound bales 100-pound bags, ur cleaned.

Allotment same as 1942. Acroage expected same as 1942.

Tons of sugar. Anticipates an increase in allotment and a corresponding increase in acres.

For frest market. Same as reported by BAE, December 1942, except that shallots are omitted and cabbage for kraut is included.

Includes apples, Epricots, sweet and sour cherries, figs, peaches, pears, plums and prunes, grapes, oranges, grapefruit, and

lemons for dried, canned and fresh use.

Dressed weight.

12/ Includes an allowence of about 10 percent of farm production for non-farm production. Average number on farms during year.

Source: U. S. Department of Agriculture, Production Goals Committee.



TOTAL STCCKS OF WHEAT, JANUARY 1, 1943 1/

Total	Terminal and Subterminal	Steel and Wooden Bins	Interior Mills and Elevators	On Farms	
1,026	246	50 2/	235	£95	Willion Bushels

1/ Dies not include stocks in elevators attached to mills which amounted to 150,000,000 bushels on October 1, 1942.

Estimated.

Source: U. S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Crop Reporting Board.

